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本稿は今年 8 月に発足したロウハーニー第二期政権のとりわけ外交政策を 1979 年
以来のイラン・イスラーム共和国政権の政治的展開の帰結として位置づけることを目的
とするものである。革命後のイランは現在に至るまで西側諸国の新自由主義的な経済
政策に対して一定の距離を堅持してきた。またパレスチナ問題に対する明確な対パレ
スチナ支持の姿勢も今後長期にわたりその基本線が変わることはないだろう。だがその
ニュアンスについて可変的であることは、イスラエルを「シオニスト国家」と呼ぶことを慎
重に回避し続けるザリーフ外相の発言などからも伺える。 
米国における 2017年の年初のトランプ政権の発足にも拘らず、イランと P5+1の間の
JCPOA がトランプ大統領によって破棄されるという可能性は極めて低い。だが革命以
来のイランの非同盟諸国重視の外交姿勢は現在に至るまで続いており、南米のベネズ
エラ・ボリビア・ブラジル・キューバといった諸国との緊密な関係もロウハーニー政権にお
いても維持されることは明白である。 
革命後のイラン外交は決してシーア派重視あるいはイスラーム重視に傾斜することな
く、それはあくまでも国益重視の姿勢に貫かれてきた。政策的な選択についても 2009
年以降は国際社会との協調の方向に大きく転換しているが、ただそれが西側と共通の
人権擁護の理念に基づいていないという問題は依然としてある。 
いずれにしても 5 月の選挙の結果、ロウハーニー政権は政策的な合理性･優位性に
ついて国民の信託を受けたものと理解すべきである。ある種の市民社会が育ちつつあ
るイランの国内政治において、いわゆる「保守派対改革派」の単純な図式はますます意
味を失いつつある。イランは今後将来的に非イデオロギー的・非革命的な通常の国家
として、日本を含む国際社会の一員としての道を歩むことが期待される。 
（文責・鈴木均） 
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Since the Islamic revolution of 1979, Iranian foreign policies have oscillated around five strategic 
preferences which set the general contours of the country’s international relations. The current strategy 
of the Rouhani administration repackages these preferences, but does not radically depart from them. 
The Iranian state, like any other state in the international system, has its national interests that it 
pursues. It has been an analytical mistake to assume that these are merely tactical and short-term, that 
Iran after the revolution acts “irrationally” and ad-hoc. Undoubtedly, there have been serious shifts in 
the way Iran positions itself in international affairs, Rouhani is not Ahmadinejad (in the same way as 
Barak Obama is not George W. Bush).1 But the strategic preferences of any state do not suddenly shift 
in total with changing governments. Strategic preferences are systemic, cultural, institutionalised. They 
have depth and longitude that go beyond the politics of the day. Rouhani is the surface effect of gradual 
changes in Iran’s domestic politics after the revolution, a product of a post-revolutionary generation 
yearning for reforms, but he is still operating within the general contours of the Islamic Republic’s 
strategic preferences as they emerged after the revolution in 1979. In the following paragraphs I will 
assess the modifications that the Rouhani presidency has brought about with a particular emphasis on 
the enduring strategic preferences of the Iranian state. Some of this research is based on my current 
book project, which analyses different forms of nationalism in a global context and with a particular 
emphasis on the Iranian case.2 It has also benefited from a lecture tour in Japan, and the fruitful 
interaction with Japanese colleagues specialising on Iran and the Middle East at the IDE-JETRO, the 
University of Tokyo and Doshisha University in Kyoto.  
 
 
I. What are Iran’s strategic preferences? 
 
The first strategic preference that has guided the ruling classes in Iran is geared to the idea of 
maximising economic independence.3 This preference was inscribed into the Iranian constitution by the 
Sorbonne educated liberals surrounding Ayatollah Khomeini at the beginning of the revolution, in 
particular the first Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and the first President Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr.4 At 
the heart of it is the conviction — similar to Islamic economic theories authored by Ayatollah 
Motahhari in Iran and Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr in Iraq — that a “just” welfare state should be at the 
centre of the economic system. While Iran has attempted to liberalise the economy in the recent years 
and while it has tried to accede to the WTO in the past, the country continues to keep a relative distance 
from multilateral institutions and radical neo-liberal reforms. The ruling classes continue to pursue a 
form of economic nationalism which manifests itself, among the policies mentioned above, also in the 
emphasis on mastering the full nuclear fuel cycle on Iranian territory. This emphasis on nuclear 
sovereignty has fuelled Iranian nationalism in recent years. With the self-perception of a great power in 
human history, Iranians deem it their natural right to take advantage of nuclear energy without 
impingement by the United States. Hence, Rouhani is trying to present Iran more vigorously in 
international economic forums and in his recent speeches he made it clear that Iran is open for business. 
                                                        
1  For a comprehensive analysis of the foreign policy under President Ahmadinejad see Anoush 
Ehteshami (2007) Iran and the rise of its neoconservatives: The politics of Tehran’s silent revolution  
2  Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (2017) Psychonationalism: Global Thought, Iranian imaginations, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
3 See further Maaike Warnaar (2013) Iranian foreign policy during Ahmadinejad: Ideology and actions 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan).  
4 Mehdi Bazargan resigned amidst the US hostage crisis. Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr fled the country into 
exile in Paris where he continues to live until today.  
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There is certainly a technocratic emphasis in his policies which are carried out by a very capable cadre 
of economic experts that he has dotted around key ministries. But it is highly unlikely that the Iranian 
state and its underbelly, in particular the powerful conglomerates affiliated to the Revolutionary Guards, 
will liberalise the economy to the degree that they lose their privileged position. There will not be a 
neo-liberal infitah policy comparable to what happened in Egypt under Sadat or Tunisia under Ben-Ali. 
The Iranian economy will continue to be mixed and the state will ensure that it does not concede too 
much ground to the private sector and even less so to foreign investors. 
     Second, since the revolution Iran has allocated immense ideological and material resources to 
the Palestinian issue with mixed results both for the Palestinians and Iran’s national interest. Yasir 
Arafat was the first major political leader to visit Iran after the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 
1979. The revolutionaries greeted him with great fanfare and handed him the keys of the Israeli 
compound in Tehran, which served as a major centre for Israeli operations during the reign of the shah. 
Moreover, in an effort to institutionalise the pro-Palestinian sentiments of his Islamic followers and the 
Iranian left, Ayatollah Khomeini designated the last Friday of Ramadan to the liberation of Jerusalem 
(so called Qods day).5 “The road to Jerusalem goes through Baghdad” was a prominent slogan of the 
millions of volunteers of the newly established Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and their Basij 
militia during the devastating Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) which drained the material and human 
resources of both countries for decades to come, exactly because the war was charged with immense 
ideological venom.6  
     Palestine has been appropriated by the Iranian state not at least in order to claim regional 
leadership and a central role as the defender of Muslim rights. For instance, religious leaders in the 
country consider holy sites such as the Al-Aqsa mosque as Islamic waqf whose sovereignty should be 
shared by all Muslims and not only by the Palestinians. There is also genuine support to the Palestinian 
cause within Iranian civil society. Several non-governmental-organisations are involved in fund raising 
efforts and several Iranian hospitals provided free medical help to Palestinians wounded in the 
successive intifadahs in the occupied territories. Rouhani has not broken from these policies. Only 
recently, Iran hosted a high ranking delegation of Islamic Jihad, there are renewed talks with the PLO 
and the country continues to have cordial relations with HAMAS despite the fall out over Syria. At the 
same time there are nuanced shifts: Iranian officials, quite comparable to the period under the reformist 
President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), have refrained from using the term “Zionist regime” to 
denote Israel and Rouhani has not targeted the country in the way his predecessor Ahmadinejad did. In 
another parallel to the Khatami years, the current foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif repeatedly 
indicated that the Iranian government would accept any final settlement that the Palestinians would 
agree to. Asked if Iran would recognize the state of Israel if the Palestinian question would be resolved, 
Zarif replied: 
You see, that’s a sovereign decision that Iran would make but it will have no consequence on the 
situation on the ground in the Middle-East. If the Palestinians are happy with the solution then nobody, 
nobody outside Palestine could prevent that from taking place. The problem for the past 60 years is that 
the Palestinians have not been happy. The Palestinians have not been satisfied and they have every 
                                                        
5  See further Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (2014), A critical introduction to Khomeini. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
6 See further Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (2006) The international Politics of the Persian Gulf: A cultural 
genealogy (London: Routledge).  
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right not to be satisfied because their most basic rights continue to be violated and people are not ready 
to address those rights.7 
Third, the revolution has buttressed a sense of grandeur in Iran’s historical consciousness which 
was equally apparent in the thinking of the shah. But whereas the shah’s dependencies on the west did 
not allow him to act upon his imperial mentality, the Islamic revolution turned Iran into an antagonist 
to US (and Israeli) hegemony in West Asia and North Africa (WANA) and the wider Muslim world in 
a grand effort to position the country as a major power pole in the international system.8 As such, Iran 
sees itself as a major competitor to US power in WANA and beyond which is exemplified by the 
country’s stringent opposition to NATO forces and US military bases in the Persian Gulf, Central Asia 
and elsewhere in Iran’s immediate geo-strategic neighbourhood. But in this regard as well, Iran has 
initiated a gradual shift in its foreign policies. For Rouhani and his administration competition with the 
United States does not preclude establishing full diplomatic ties between the two countries. In my 
conversations with Iranians close to the administration the model of China is repeatedly invoked. China 
and the United States have serious differences in eastern Asia, not at least over the contentious issue of 
Taiwan. But the two countries have close economic ties and they have managed to liaise diplomatically 
as well. The future of Iranian-American ties could be similar. On issues of agreement, the territorial 
integrity of Iraq, opposition to the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda groups throughout the Muslim 
world, Iran and the United States have a lot of reason to foster enduring security links. On issues of 
disagreement, Palestine/Israel, Syria and Hezbollah, the two countries are likely to tip toe around each 
other and try to pursue their national interests without a zero-sum mentality that would antagonise the 
other side Such a mitigated “cold peace” could be a major factor in stabilising the region. After all, the 
key to many crises in the region lies in Tehran, whether the detractors of the country like it or not.  
     Both Rouhani and Obama campaigned on the basis that they will talk to the other side and 
indeed they delivered that campaign promise. The outcome was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA), which resolved the stand-off over Iran’s nuclear energy programme. The 
administration of Donald Trump, however, seems to pursue an incoherent policy of harassment, which 
is threatening the hard-won JCPOA and Iran’s efforts to stabilise its relations with the United States. I 
don’t deem the Trump presidency in the position to derail the JCPOA, given that it was signed off by 
the five United Nations Security Council members plus Germany. In its efforts to undermine the 
JCPOA, the Trump Presidency seems isolated. Trump can’t lead on this issue. However, the erratic 
approach to the region in general that has characterised Trump’s foreign policy may trigger an adverse 
reaction from Iran. Persian pride may rear its head at some stage, and lead to detrimental reactions in 
the war zones of Syria, Yemen and elsewhere. 
     Fourth, since the revolution of 1979 Iranian foreign policy elites have called for the 
empowerment of the “third world”. To that end the Islamic Republic immediately ceased its 
membership of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and became a strong advocate of the Non-
Aligned-Movement. This policy has transmuted into a discourse accentuating the need for a multi-polar 
world order that is not dominated by one superpower. Naturally, Iran perceives itself as one of the 
poles in such an international system together with Brazil, India, China, Russia, the European Union 
                                                        
7 Fars News Agency (FNA) (2014), 5 February, 
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921116001667 (accessed 12 February 2014).  
8 In my writings I have stopped using the term “Middle East” due to its Eurocentric legacies. For 
instance, from the perspective of Japan countries such as Iran, Iraq and Egypt are not in the “Middle 
East” from a geographic perspective. West Asia and North Africa is a rather more accurate geographic 
designation.  
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and the United States. The non-aligned policy encapsulated in slogans such as na sharghi, na gharbi, 
jomhuri-ye eslami (neither eastern nor western, only the Islamic Republic) has manifested itself in 
Iran’s close relations with likeminded governments in Latin America, in particular the “Bolivarian” 
vanguard in Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador and Nicaragua. Iran has fostered close political 
and economic relations with these countries in the past decades. The former President of Brazil, Lula, 
even took the audacious step, together with Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan, to propose a solution to 
the nuclear impasse during the Ahmadinejad presidency which was rejected by the White House. While 
it is a priority of the Rouhani administration to mend ties with the United States, Rouhani has indicated 
that he will deepen Iran’s existing relations with Latin America. 9 Given that these have attained 
strategic dimensions, his administration has plenty of opportunity to that end.  
     And finally, since the Islamic revolution of 1979 the discourse of Iran’s ruling elites has 
focused on the ideal of Islamic communitarianism which the Iranian state pursues primarily through the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the network of bonyads (foundations) that operate in 
the country’s clerical “Vatican”, Qom. While the symbols and imagery of the revolution were steeped 
in Iranian-nationalist and Shia traditions, Ayatollah Khomeini was adamant to portray the revolution as 
pan-Islamic, indeed as a revolts of all the oppressed against their oppressors, not at least in order to 
extend the claim for leadership beyond the confines of the Shia minority within Islam. To that end, the 
revolutionaries instituted “unity week”, a culturally driven policy to institutionalise ecumenical unity 
between Sunni and Shia. At the same time, Iran has never really sacrificed the country’s national 
interest to the pan-Islamic utopia. The ruling classes of the country have been very careful not to 
criticise Russia and China for their brutal policies against their Muslim minorities in Chechnya and 
Xinjiang province respectively, in order not to jeopardise Iran’s cordial relations with the two countries. 
Similarly, Iran tends to support Christian-orthodox Armenia in their territorial dispute with Shia-
majority Azerbaijan. There is no automatic pan-Islamic solidarity that the Iranian state can afford to 
pursue on every occasion. While closer cooperation between Muslim-majority countries is pursued 
through various institutions, the pan-Islamic ambitions of the revolution have been conscribed by the 
outfit of the Iranian nation-state which demands raison d’état, a state centric rationality that does not 
lend itself to caliphatic adventures.  
 
 
II. The domestic determinants of Iran’s international affairs 
 
As indicated the five strategic preferences of the Iranian state continue to be salient during the 
Rouhani presidency, despite the apparent shifts in Iran’s international disposition. The bargaining 
position of the Iranian President is particularly strong because he has repeatedly received the backing 
of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who made it unmistakeably clear that the president has 
a green light to pursue his policies of constructive engagement which made it possible to seek direct 
diplomatic negotiations over the nuclear issue with the Obama administration. Of course, the re-
election in this year, which was foreseeable, has strengthened the hand of President Rouhani even 
further. Hence, and in many ways for the first time in Iran’s post-revolutionary history, the two most 
powerful institutions of the Iranian state emphasise detente and diplomacy in international affairs as a 
means to maximise Iran’s national interest, even if Iran continues to extend its strategic depth from 
                                                        
9  IRIB World Service (2014) ‘Iran firm to boost ties with Latin America: President Rouhani’ 10 
February, http://english.irib.ir/news/iran1/item/178359-iran-firm-to-boost-ties-with-latin-america-
president-rouhani (accessed 12 February 2014). 
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Afghanistan, Yemen and Iraq to Lebanon and Syria. This shift is exemplified in the cultural imagery of 
the Islamic Republic. In the current discourse, and discernible from Ayatollah Khamenei’s central 
policy speech accentuating “heroic flexibility” in Iran’s dealings with international adversaries, the 
Islamic Republic accentuates the pragmatism of Imam Hassan, the grandson of the prophet Mohammad 
and the third Imam of the Shia.10 Addressing senior veterans of the Revolutionary Guards Khamenei 
maintained that a ‘technical wrestler also shows flexibility for technical reasons sometimes, but he 
would never forget who his rival is and what his main goal is.’11 Hence, whereas the revolutionaries of 
yesterday emphasised the romantic “heroism” and sacrifice of Hassan’s younger brother, Imam 
Hossein, who together with his family was killed by the armies of Yazid in the seventh century CE, 
today the ruling classes in Iran repeatedly refer to his older brother Imam Hassan who is known for his 
pragmatism, level-headedness and politically accommodating strategies. Hence, whereas the Hussein 
paradigm emphasises revolutionary change manifesting itself in Hossein’s self-sacrifice during the 
battle of Karbala, the “Hassan paradigm” symbolises pragmatism, exemplified in the peace treaty that 
Hassan signed with Muawiya when he voluntarily handed over to him the leadership of the umma in 
the seventh century CE.  
     But there are also concrete institutional changes in the foreign policy decision making process 
of the Islamic Republic, for instance the nuclear dossier has been firmly in the hands of the foreign 
ministry with no tangible interference by the conservative National Security Council. The foreign 
ministry itself has been staffed with the best and the brightest of Iran’s post-revolutionary diplomatic 
cadres. And in another sign for the consensual policies between the President and the Supreme Leader, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has repeatedly signalled to the influential Revolutionary Guards, that they 
should not interfere in the current diplomatic process. Although, Rouhani is not a radical reformist in 
domestic politics, there are incremental shifts away from the highly securitised atmosphere that was 
characteristic for the Ahmadinejad presidency, in particular after the mass demonstrations against his 
re-election in 2009. The censorship regime has been slightly relaxed and Iranian civil society has 
started to function with fewer restrictions again. Of course, Iran is still far away from institutionalising 
a proper code of conduct that would secure the human rights of its citizens. This lack of attention to the 
demands of Iranians within the country and outside continues to be one of the major shortcomings of 
successive Iranian governments. 
     Here, it is analytically central to point out that Rouhani (and all the Presidents before him for 
that matter) are products and not drivers of those changes which are determined by the preference 
settings of Iranian society. I have theorised this as a “pluralistic momentum” that continuously 
impinges on the realm of the state through a bottom-up-process, from Iranian society to the ruling 
classes and Dr. Ghoncheh Tazmini has called this “modernisation from below” in her excellent work 
on Iranian reformism.12 The central characteristic of this buttom-up process in Iran, is that the clerical 
establishment can no longer take for granted the allegiance of their client social strata.  Pluralism 
engenders competition, state policies have to be “sold” to an audience that is no longer obliged to “buy” 
from one source. In this “market situation” the monopoly on political power is dissected. As a result, 
                                                        
10 Amir Dabiri Mehr ‘ 
http://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/09/2854/khameneis-heroic-flexibilty/ 
11 Iranian Diplomacy (2013) ‘Supreme Leader underlines belief in insightful “heroic flexibility”’, 17 
September, 
http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/page/1921549/Supreme+Leader+Underlines+Belief+in+Insightful+quot
%3BHeroic+Flexibilityquot%3B.html (accessed 12 February 2014).  
12 See further Ghoncheh Tazmini (2012) Revolution and reform in Russia and Iran: Modernisation and 
politics in revolutionary states (London: IB Tauris).  
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institutions and elites operating within the domain of the state have to organise themselves in such a 
way as to mobilise their respective constituencies. They enter into a competitive situation with other 
groups who follow the same political rationale. Comparing electoral campaigns in Tehran, Shiraz, 
Ahwaz, Tabriz, Isfahan, and other cities in my field research, I considered it one of the rather more 
remarkable aspects, that the presidential candidates, including conservative ones such as Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad or more recently the presidential candidate Ebrahim Raisi, scarcely employed Islamic 
imagery or reference to the political will of Ayatollah Khomeini to further their agenda. The campaign 
of Rouhani was very similar, geared to specific issues, mostly economic ones, rather than abstract 
slogans. In short: Iranian leaders understand that it is public opinion that matters – it is Iran’s strong 
civil society that affects the way politics are made.  
      In the second place, all institutions attached to the state are under pressure to produce results, 
especially in the economic sphere. In turn, the pressure to produce results in a competitive situation 
engenders the rationalisation of policies. This explains why both reformers and conservatives advocate 
economic growth and public participation in the political and cultural process. In a pluralistic situation 
where political parties become marketing agencies of the state, reform ceases to be a monopoly of the 
self-declared reformist parties. In other words, the reform agenda is of necessity intrinsic to the 
political process comprising all state institutions; it transcends the mono-causal conservative-reformist 
divide because the functioning of the whole state apparatus depends on the participation of the public. 
Public relations with the client social strata, lobbying, fund-raising, involvement with the secular 
economy ― in all these aspects of the humdrum affairs of the state, the Islamic Republic is dependent 
on the civil society of the country. In such an interactive situation it is not impossible (for conservatives 
and reformists alike) to sell policies to a population of consumers without taking their wishes 
concerning the content of those policies into account. As such, Rouhani is a surface effect of these 
dynamics and his reconciliatory foreign policies, especially towards the west, reflect the preference 
setting of the mainstream of Iranian society. Persia, after all, has had also a long standing exposure to 
the Occident; it is both eastern and western.  
     There are sociological factors for the capacity of Iranian society to drive this pluralistic 
momentum: In 1980, at the beginning of the revolution, there were merely 175,000 students and 15,000 
lecturers spread around 20 cities in Iran. In 2012, there were four million higher education students and 
over 110,000 lecturers in 120 cities. In 2010, Iran ranked higher in the United Nation’s Human 
Development index than Brazil and Turkey.13 According to the British Royal Society, the number of 
scientific publications in Iran increased from 736 in 1996 to 13,238 in 2008, the fastest such growth in 
the world. 14 In addition, the number of internet users rose dramatically by 13,000%.15 In 2012, Iran 
announced that it will establish a nanotechnology centre and allocate 4% of GDP to research and 
development as a part of a comprehensive plan for science. This is one of the highest allocations of 
                                                        
13 See further Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (2013) On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian revolution: Power 
and resistance today (London: Bloomsbury), p. 145.  
14 See further ‘Iran and Global Scientific Collaboration in the 21st Century’ (2011) Association of 
Professors and Scholars of Iranian Heritage, 3 September,  
http://www.apsih.org/index.php/news/english-news/275-iran-and-global-scientific-collaboration-in-the-
21st-century (accessed 12 January 2012). On the growth of the science sectors see also The Royal 
Society (2011) Knowledge, Networks and Nations: Global Scientific Collaboration in the 21st Century, 
London, March, 
http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2011/4294976134.pdf 
(accessed 12 June 2011), p. 21. 
15 The Royal Society, Knowledge, Networks and Nations, p. 65. 
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research in the world. In effect then, the Islamic revolution has seriously expanded the geography of 
knowledge in Iran which has had an effect on the preference setting of Iranian civil society.     
 
 
III. Conclusions 
 
Iran under Rouhani has changed, in particular with regard to the country’s international affairs 
and attitudes towards reconciliation with the United States. But these nuanced changes are tempered by 
the enduring strategic preferences of the state which will continue to guide the international affairs of 
the Islamic Republic. These preferences of the Iranian state do not preclude closer relations with the 
United States and even a tacit accommodation of the issue of Israel. But they make it impossible that 
Iran emerges as a subservient pawn. Ultimately, for the world, the Iran of the future will not be the Iran 
of the shah. Every Iranian president after the revolution of 1979 has been voted into office to deliver 
Iran’s national interest and to move the state towards more democracy and accountability. These 
preference settings of Iranian civil society have been boosted by the Arab revolts which have 
demonstrated that the new yardstick of politics in the region is not ideology anymore, but democracy, 
respect for human rights and social equality. President Rouhani is merely the latest manifestation of 
these realities of contemporary Iranian society and the regional context that Iran is embedded in. For 
the world, including Japan of course, this non-revolutionary Iran should mean more engagement with 
the country in all fields, including culture, economics and security. The mistakes of the past should be 
prevented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
